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LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
PERCEPTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CATCH 
SHARES 
Mark Fina* & Tyson Kade** 
Abstract: Catch shares are a fishery management strategy under which 
persons are allocated exclusive access to specific portions of the total allowable 
catch of a fishery. Proponents of catch share management argue that these 
programs allow for more efficient management of annual catch limits and 
mitigate the negative biological and economic impacts associated with other 
management programs. Because of the exclusivity of their allocations, catch 
share programs have been characterized by their opponents as privatizing the 
public fisheries resource and granting catch share holders a property right to 
fish. However, case law suggests that a court is unlikely to conclude that catch 
shares constitute property or entitle a share holder to compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment takings clause if those shares are revoked or modified.  
Nevertheless, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act instills catch shares with more attributes of property than other fishing 
permits. This paper examines the existing authority for establishing catch share 
management programs and the property right implications of that authority. 
Despite the low probability that a court would find a compensable taking, an 
analysis of takings law provides useful guidance to policymakers and fishery 
managers as they attempt to develop catch share programs. Consideration of 
takings law can help managers to structure a program that provides some of the 
benefits that arise from property rights, while avoiding potential claims of 
entitlement from catch share holders when program modifications are 
implemented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Catch shares are a fishery management strategy under 
which individuals, harvesting cooperatives, communities, or 
other entities are allocated exclusive access to specific portions 
of the total allowable catch of a fishery.1 Proponents of catch 
share management argue that these programs allow for more 
efficient management of annual catch limits, mitigate negative 
biological and economic impacts associated with the race for 
fish that typically arises under limited access management, 
and promote safer and more profitable fishing practices.2 
1. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY i, available 
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/noaa_cs_policy.pdf. 
2. See generally EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES (Donald R. Leal 
2
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Because of the exclusivity of allocations, catch share programs 
have been characterized by their opponents as privatizing the 
public fisheries resource and granting catch share holders a 
property right to fish.3  
Since 1990, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA 
Fisheries), the federal agency tasked by the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson-
Stevens Act”) with managing the nation’s fisheries, has 
implemented seventeen catch share programs.4 In response to 
increased support for the use of catch share management 
programs, in 2010, NOAA Fisheries released its Catch Share 
Policy, which states: 
[T]o achieve long-term ecological and economic 
sustainability of the Nation’s fishery resources and 
fishing communities, NOAA encourages the 
consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever 
appropriate in fishery management and ecosystem 
plans and their amendments, and will support the 
design, implementation, and monitoring of catch share 
programs.5 
Despite the increased support for the development of catch 
share programs,6 program modifications are strongly resisted 
ed., 2005) (wherein several economists describe their perspectives on these benefits). 
3. Daniel Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fishery Policy, 34 
FISHERIES 280, 283–84 (2009); Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and 
Fisheries for the Twenty First Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic 
Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 638–43 (2004). 
4. See Catch Shares – Programs by Region, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/catchshare_region.htm 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
5. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3, 7; “NOAA Fisheries 
developed its catch share policy to “encourage well-designed catch share programs to 
help maintain or rebuild fisheries, and sustain fishermen, communities and vibrant 
working waterfronts, including the cultural and resource access traditions that have 
been part of this country since its founding.” Id. at i. 
6. See, e.g., KATE BONZON, ET AL., CATCH SHARE DESIGN MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR 
MANAGERS AND FISHERMEN (2010), available at 
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/catch-share-design-manual.pdf; THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DESIGN MATTERS: MAKING CATCH SHARES WORK (2009), 
available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_l
ife/CatchShare.pdf?n=5322; NATIONAL PANEL ON THE COMMUNITY DIMENSIONS OF 
FISHERIES CATCH SHARE PROGRAMS, COMMUNITY DIMENSIONS OF FISHERIES CATCH 
SHARE PROGRAMS: INTEGRATING ECONOMY, EQUITY, AND ENVIRONMENT (2011), 
available at  http://www.ecotrust.org/fisheries/NPCDFCSP_paper_031511.pdf (The 
strength of the movement toward catch share management is evident as non-
3
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by share holders who assert a loss of property based on the 
concern that their investments may be devalued by 
modifications. 
While the Magnuson-Stevens Act contains a disclaimer that 
catch shares do not confer a compensable property right,7 the 
characterization and implementation of catch share programs 
have created the opposite perception among fishermen. For 
example, the hallmark of a catch share program is that it 
provides a share holder with exclusive access to a specified 
amount of catch.8 Much like traditional property, a fisherman 
can typically buy, sell, or lease catch shares thereby adjusting 
the amount of fish that the share holder could harvest. While 
initially issued for a specified duration, the 2006 Magnuson-
Stevens Act Reauthorization includes a provision for renewal 
of catch shares unless those shares are revoked, limited, or 
modified under the terms of the program.9 NOAA Fisheries has 
characterized this renewal as creating a “rolling conditional 
permanence” of catch shares.10 In addition, the 2006 
Magnuson-Stevens Act Reauthorization allowed the use of 
auctions or other royalty programs where fishermen would pay 
for an allocation of catch shares.11 Finally, for certain fisheries, 
NOAA Fisheries may provide federal financing, with loan 
durations of up to twenty-five or thirty years, to allow 
fishermen to purchase catch shares.12 
In the event of an amendment or revocation of an 
established catch share program, catch share holders may 
bring suit against the federal government in an attempt to 
recover any lost property value.13 The Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides that “nor shall private 
governmental organizations have issued manuals to ensure that their organizations’ 
objectives are considered in the development of catch share programs.). 
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). 
8. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at i. 
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(f)(1)-(3) (Supp. V 2006).  
10. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., THE DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS 
PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 27 (NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-86) (Lee 
Anderson and Mark Holliday eds., 2007), available at 
http://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/tm/tm86.pdf. 
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(d) (Supp. V 2006). 
12. Id. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006); 50 C.F.R. § 253.27–.30 (2012). 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). (The Tucker Act vests the United States Court of 
Federal Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for a 
taking in excess of $10,000).  
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”14 
To establish a taking of property for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, a claimant must first establish a property interest.15 
If such an interest exists, the claimant must establish that the 
government action constitutes a compensable taking of that 
property interest.16 If the alleged taking is not categorical, 
meaning that the property owner retains some economic 
value,17 the court will determine whether a taking occurred 
based upon an examination of the following three factors: (1) 
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) 
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the 
governmental action.”18 
Courts have concluded that catch shares are property in 
certain contexts,19 but have not yet addressed this question for 
purposes of compensation for a Fifth Amendment taking. 
When considering the revocation of other types of fishing 
permits, the courts have conclusively held that these permits 
are revocable privileges, they are not property, and that the 
permit holder is not entitled to any compensation as a result of 
changes to the management regime or revocation of the 
permit.20 However, given the nature of catch shares, and the 
manner in which catch share programs are established, it 
could be argued that catch shares are more akin to property 
than the fishing permits that have been subject to Fifth 
Amendment analysis to date. 
This paper examines the rationale and existing authority for 
establishing catch share management programs. It also 
summarizes how courts have considered Fifth Amendment 
takings claims involving fishing permits, and considers 
whether the inclusion of certain measures in catch share 
programs could influence a court’s decision of whether catch 
14. U.S. CONST., amend. V, cl. 4. 
15. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
16. Id.  
17. Id. (citations omitted).  
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1973). 
19. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 599–600 (Alaska 1996) (IFQs are property 
in marital dissolution); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (IFQ is property for procedural due process). 
20.  E.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 379 F.3d at 1379; Conti v. United States, 291 
F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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shares are a compensable property right. Given the novelty of 
catch share management and the transitions brought on by 
their introduction in a fishery, the need for program revisions 
should be anticipated. Recognizing that a court is unlikely to 
determine that catch shares are property rights for Fifth 
Amendment compensation purposes, the paper identifies 
considerations for the development of catch share programs 
and amendments to those programs, as well as successor 
management programs, that could minimize perceptions that 
catch shares are property and reduce the potential for permit 
holders to seek compensation for investment losses in a catch 
share-based fishery management regime. Maintaining 
awareness of the considerations that lead share holders to 
conclude catch shares are private property (even if a court will 
not likely find property rights in catch shares) may treat catch 
share holders more equitably by allowing for program 
modifications with less disruption to their interests in the 
fishery.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Economic Justification for Development of Catch Shares as 
a Fishery Management Tool 
1. Economic Issues Associated with Traditional Fisheries 
Management 
Economists developed the foundations of catch share 
management to address perceived shortcomings arising from 
an absence of property rights in fisheries.21 Fisheries are 
generally considered a public trust resource. Principles of the 
public trust doctrine have guided fishery management for 
centuries.22 Under that doctrine, fisheries resources are held 
21. Rögnvaldur Hannesson, The Privatization of Oceans, in EVOLVING PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 25, 31–37. 
22. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 
ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 39–45 (1999) (The public trust doctrine dates to 
Roman and English common law. Courts have frequently applied the doctrine to state 
management of fishery resources, interpreting fish as being public assets to be 
managed for the benefit of the public until captured.). See generally Douglas F. Britton, 
The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public 
Trust, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 217 (1997) (describing the application of the public 
trust doctrine and related common law doctrines that prevent the establishment of 
property rights in fish or fishing permits. It should be noted that the public trust 
doctrine has not been directly applied by courts to federal waters of the exclusive 
6
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by the government in trust to be managed and regulated for 
the public’s benefit. Resources subject to the public trust 
doctrine are inalienable and cannot be transferred. The public 
may access and use public trust resources subject to 
regulations intended to advance the public good. The public 
trust doctrine has often been applied to provide fishermen with 
open access to fisheries, allowing anyone to take fish. It should 
be noted that the public trust doctrine has not been directly 
applied by courts to federal waters of the EEZ, which are those 
waters between three and 200 nautical miles from the coastal 
baseline. 
Over time, the absence of regulatory restrictions may result 
in overcapitalization, and possibly overexploitation, of the 
fishery as individuals perceiving an opportunity to draw 
increased benefit from use of the resource increase effort 
through deploying more (or more productive) vessels and 
fishing gear. A progression of regulatory restrictions may be 
applied in an attempt to constrain effort in the fishery to 
protect the resource or economic returns.23 These restrictions 
may include defined seasons or other temporal constraints, 
restrictions on entry or gear, and limits on total allowable 
catch. Despite these restrictions, participants frequently 
exploit regulatory gaps in order to increase effort. For example, 
vessel length limits may be ineffective in limiting growth of 
capacity if vessel owners are permitted to increase vessel width 
and engine horsepower.  
Economists have observed that, faced with restrictions on 
inputs, fishery participants will typically find ways to increase 
effort to fully dissipate rents (or scarcity profits) from a 
fishery.24 The phenomenon of rent dissipation arises from 
common pool resource management, which allows any person 
economic zone (EEZ)). See also Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine 
to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288 (2007). 
Federal waters are those waters between three and 200 nautical miles from the coastal 
baseline. 
23. See Lynch, supra note 22, at 302–3 (Regulation of uses to protect fishery 
resources, such as limits on entry, gear type, and seasons, are generally regarded as 
consistent with the public trust obligation to manage the resource for the public 
benefit.). 
24. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 21–25 (Rents are the difference 
between revenues and costs of production (including normal profits or returns to 
capital). In natural resource markets, extraordinary profits or rents may be available 
because of the scarcity of the resource.). 
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to derive a benefit from use of the resource. Rather than invest 
in a manner that derives maximum total profits from the 
resource, each person will invest to derive maximum individual 
profits, given the behavior of others. Participants typically 
invest to secure a greater share of the total resource, instead of 
producing a defined share of the resource at the least cost. 
These expenditures to increase one’s share of the fishery will 
dissipate profits from the resource.25 
2. Economic Rationale for Use of Catch Shares 
Economists, influenced in large part by the dissipation of 
rents from fisheries under existing management regimes, 
began to advocate for the development of harvest privileges 
bearing some characteristics of private property rights, such as 
individual fishing quotas or individual transferable 
quotas,26 now more commonly known as catch shares.27 Under 
a catch share management program, participants are allocated 
an exclusive portion of the annual total allowable catch.28 
These catch share allocations are intended to align each 
participant’s individual profits and the total profits from the 
fishery.29 Since a person’s allocation provides access to a 
specific amount of fish (regardless of the catches of others), the 
catch share holder will deploy fishing effort to realize the 
25. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 5–9; James E. Wilen, Property 
Rights and the Texture of Rents in Fisheries, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 53–55, 64. 
26. Over time, a variety of terms have been used to describe systems that are now 
collectively referred to as “catch shares,” including individual fishing quotas (IFQs), 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), dedicated access privileges (DAPs), and limited 
access privileges (LAPs). This paper refers to these specific terms, when applied by 
managers to describe a particular program, but otherwise uses the generic, all 
encompassing, term “catch shares.” Where relevant, differences in the terms are 
described.  
27. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 5–6. See generally H. Scott 
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. 
ECON. 124 (1954) (thought to be the origin of catch shares and other individual fishing 
quotas), and Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. 
ECON. 116 (1955). On economists’ evaluation of catch shares, see, e.g,. EVOLVING 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2; James L. Anderson, Property 
Rights, Fisheries, Aquaculture, and the Future, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 239–57 (asserting that fisheries will need to 
develop catch shares (or property rights) to remain competitive with aquaculture and 
other catch share fisheries). 
28. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at i. 
29. Although an allocation is not exclusive with respect to specific fish, the allocation 
provides an exclusive share of the permitted catch. 
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greatest gain from those fish, rather than deploying effort to 
secure a greater share of the fishery.30  
Under these conditions, the individual catch share holder’s 
choices should also maximize profits from the fishery overall. 
Arguably, imbuing catch share allocations with more 
characteristics of property rights should increase the degree of 
alignment between individual profits and total profits from a 
fishery. For example, allowing free divisibility and transfer of 
shares would allow shares of less efficient harvesters to be 
acquired by more efficient harvesters, with both participants 
increasing returns along with an increase in total returns from 
the fishery. In addition, increasing the tenure of shares—for 
example, by making allocations permanent rather than for a 
term of years—could increase stewardship in the resource by 
share holders, who will perceive a future benefit from stock 
conservation efforts.31  
B. Magnuson-Stevens Act Catch Share Authority 
1. History of Catch Shares under the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, management authority 
over federal fisheries is vested in eight regional Councils and 
the Secretary of Commerce.32 The Councils are comprised of 
representatives from each state in the Council’s region, and a 
state fishery management official from each constituent 
state.33 The primary responsibility of each Council is to develop 
fishery management plans (FMP) governing the regional 
fisheries consistent with conservation and management 
standards established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act.34 These 
national standards include: “prevent[ing] overfishing while 
30. Hannesson, supra note 21, at 34. Wilen, supra note 25, at 53–55. 
31. See generally R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-Based Approaches to 
Sustainable Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUAT. SCI. 699 (2006) (Collective 
actions of catch share holders to influence managers to take actions to protect stocks 
are cited as evidence of this stewardship effect.). 
32. Pub. L. No. 104-297 (1996) (Sustainable Fisheries Act amending and 
reauthorizing the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976). Pub. 
L. No. 109-479 (2006) (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act). 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2006) (explaining the purpose of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act).  
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)–(b) (Supp. V 2006). 
34. Id. § 1852(h)(1).  
9
Fina and Kade: Legal and Policy Implications of the Perception of Property Right
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
292 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each 
fishery”; “consider[ing] efficiency in the utilization of fishery 
resources”; and “minimiz[ing] bycatch and .  .  .  the mortality 
of such bycatch.”35 
As initially adopted, the Magnuson-Stevens Act did not 
expressly authorize catch shares. Instead, authority for catch 
share management was found in the Act’s authorization of 
limited access programs. Specifically, the Act provided regional 
Councils and the Secretary of Commerce with the authority to 
create “systems to limit access to [a] fishery” provided those 
systems: 
take into account – 
(A) present participation in the fishery; 
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, 
the fishery; 
(C) the economics of the fishery; 
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery 
to engage in other fisheries; 
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the 
fishery and any affected fishing communities; 
(F) the fair and equitable distribution of access 
privileges in the fishery; and  
(G) any other relevant considerations[.]36 
The 1975 Senate Commerce Committee Report, prepared in 
conjunction with the initial Magnuson-Stevens Act, identified 
three management measures to limit access to a fishery.37 
First, a limit on the number of vessels, fishermen, or inputs 
could be established. Second, a fee or tax on participation could 
be used to deter entry beyond the desired participation level. 
Third, the total allowable catch could be divided into “shares or 
quotas” which are then distributed to participants. This third 
suggested measure is effectively a catch share.38 No specific 
35. Id. § 1851(a). 
36. Id. § 1853(b)(6). 
37. S. REP. NO. 94-416 (1975), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMMISSION ON 
COMMERCE AND NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 653, 691–92 (Comm. 
Print 1976). 
38. Senator Ted Stevens, however, asserted in the discussion of the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act in 1995 that “IFQ’s [sic] are a new tool that we did not even consider in 
1990, the last time we reauthorized the Magnuson Act. They were not even dreamed of 
when we first passed the Magnuson Act.” 142 CONG. REC. S10810 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 
1996). 
10
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reference was made to the nature of the privilege created by 
any limited access permit (or the revocability of any such 
permit) in the initial version of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. 
Between 1988 and 1992, three Councils relied upon the 
general authority to limit access to fisheries to develop catch 
share programs.39 In 1988, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery 
Management Council developed the first IFQ system to 
manage the Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery.40 In 
1991, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council 
developed an IFQ system for the wreckfish fishery.41 In 1992, 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council developed an 
IFQ program for the halibut and sablefish fisheries.42 For each 
of these actions, the Councils identified their general authority 
to limit access to the fishery as providing the authority to 
develop a catch share program. 
Following development of these programs (and the 
controversies surrounding their implementation), in 1996 
Congress adopted specific requirements for the development of 
IFQ programs in the Sustainable Fisheries Act.43 Congress 
defined an “individual fishing quota” as “a Federal permit 
under a limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish, 
expressed by a unit or units representing a percentage of the 
total allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or held 
for exclusive use by a person . . .”44 To quell the immediate 
controversy, the Sustainable Fisheries Act contained a 
moratorium on the submission and implementation of IFQ 
39. For a comprehensive discussion of the authority for IFQs under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act prior to its most recent reauthorization, see George J. Mannina, Jr., Is 
There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual Fishing Quotas? 3 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 5 (1997). 
40. MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, AMENDMENT #8, FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE ATLANTIC SURF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG FISHERY 54 
(1990). 
41. SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, AMENDMENT 5 (WRECKFISH), 
REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY DETERMINATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE 
SNAPPER-GROUPER FISHERY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION 18 (1991).  
42. Final Rule for Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375, 59,379–
81 (Nov. 9, 1993).  
43. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,810–18 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) for an extensive 
discussion of the controversy by Senators Ted Stevens, John Kerry, Patty Murray, and 
Slade Gorton. 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23) (Supp. V 2006). 
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programs until October 1, 2000.45 The Sustainable Fisheries 
Act also clarified Congressional intent that permits (including 
both limited access permits and IFQs) are privileges, revocable 
without compensation to the holder. The act provides: 
(2)(A) No provision of law shall be construed to limit the 
authority of a Council to submit and the Secretary to 
approve the termination or limitation, without 
compensation to holders of any limited access system 
permits, of a fishery management plan, plan 
amendment, or regulation that provides for a limited 
access system, including an individual fishing quota 
program.46 
and  
(3) An individual fishing quota or other limited access 
system authorization— 
(A) shall be considered a permit for purposes of 
sections 1857, 1858, and 1859 of this title; 
(B) may be revoked or limited at any time in 
accordance with this chapter; 
(C) shall not confer any right of compensation to the 
holder of such individual fishing quota or other 
such limited access system authorization if it is 
revoked or limited; and  
(D) shall not create, or be construed to create, any 
right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the 
fish is harvested.47 
In addition, Congress commissioned the National Academy 
of Sciences to prepare a report on IFQs and directed the 
Secretary to use the report to develop a national policy on 
IFQs.48 The report was to address “all aspects of such quotas” 
including transferability, limits on foreign control of IFQs, 
limits on duration of IFQ programs, and measures to minimize 
adverse effects on fishing communities.49  
While the Sustainable Fisheries Act may have codified 
Congressional intent that IFQs are a fishing privilege, 
revocable without compensation, other aspects of that Act 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(1)(A) (1994), repealed by Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 106, Pub. L. No. 109-
479, 120 Stat. 3586 (Jan. 12, 2007). 
46. Id. § 1853(d)(2)(A). 
47. Id. § 1853(d)(3). 
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furthered the ambiguity concerning the nature of the privilege 
created by IFQs (and the extent to which policymakers 
intended to induce interested parties to treat IFQs as if they 
are property rights). First, the Sustainable Fisheries Act 
directed the Secretary to establish an “exclusive central 
registry system . . . for limited access system 
permits . . . including individual fishing quotas” for the 
“registration of title to, and interests in, such permits.”50 Such 
a lien registry is typically intended to secure and prioritize 
liens and other interests applied to private property interests. 
Second, the Sustainable Fisheries Act authorized Councils to 
develop loan programs to support the purchase of IFQs by 
small boat fishermen and first time purchasers of IFQs.51 
These federally funded loans effectively induce purchase of 
shares by persons wishing to enter or expand their interests in 
IFQ fisheries. Although neither of these provisions directly 
conflict with Congress’s intent that IFQs create no 
compensable property right, both provisions promote IFQs as 
transferable fishing privileges that may be acquired through 
long-term, secure financing arrangements, typically 
characteristic of property interests. 
In October of 2002, after a two-year extension, the 
moratorium expired.52 After repeated efforts to revise the 
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(h)(1) (1994). 
51. Id. § 1853(d)(4)(A), repealed by Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 106, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3586 
(Jan. 12, 2007), recodified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006). In addition, the Act 
directed the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to recommend to the 
Secretary a loan program for the financing of halibut and sablefish IFQs. Sustainable 
Fisheries Act, §108(g), Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3579 (Oct. 11, 1996). 
52. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Appendix D § 144(a), Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763A-238 (Dec. 21, 2000). Despite its moratorium on IFQs, Congress 
continued to authorize the development of catch share programs for certain fisheries 
through specific legislation. In 1998, the American Fisheries Act established a 
“cooperative program” for the Bering Sea Pollock fishery. American Fisheries Act, §§ 
205-211, enacted as part of Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-616 (Oct. 20, 1998). In 
addition, as a part of the legislation extending the IFQ moratorium, Congress directed 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to examine catch share management 
for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries and the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands 
crab fisheries. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Appendix D § 144(b), Pub. L. 
No.106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-238 (Dec. 21, 2000). After the North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council developed the required catch share program for the Bering Sea 
and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries, Congress mandated its implementation. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, § 801, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 108 
(Jan. 23, 2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1862(j) (Supp. V 2006)).  
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Magnuson-Stevens Act provisions authorizing catch share 
programs,53 Congress included revisions of that authority as a 
part of the 2006 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
Management Reauthorization Act.54 These provisions define 
the current authority for establishing catch share systems. 
C. Current Catch Share Authority under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act 
The 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
made substantial changes to the authority of Councils and the 
Secretary of Commerce to develop and implement catch share 
programs.55 The reauthorization maintains the clear 
statement, codified by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, that 
catch shares are a privilege subject to revocation without 
compensation.56 Specifically, in its current form, the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act provides that catch shares (or limited 
access privileges, as they are defined by that Act):57 
53. See, e.g., IFQ Act of 2001, S. 637, 107th Cong. (2001); Fishing Quota Act of 2003, 
S. 1106, 108th Cong. (2003). 
54. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Management Reauthorization Act, § 
106, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3586 (Jan. 12, 2007). 
55. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (Supp. V 2006)). The Act adopted the defined 
term “limited access privileges” (LAPs) to include a broader range of holders of catch 
shares than the traditional holders of IFQs. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(26) (Supp. V 2006). 
Although the wording of the definition is unchanged, the change in terms is intended 
to emphasize the introduction of two new types of catch share holders: regional fishing 
associations, which may hold LAPs for the benefit of regional interests, and fishing 
communities, which may hold LAPs for the benefit of a community. See S. REP. NO. 
109-229, at 8 (2006). 
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). In addition, the Report of the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation states that: 
NO CREATION OF RIGHT, TITLE, OR INTEREST.—The new section 303A(b) 
would re-affirm existing law relating to IFQs that a LAPP is a permit that may be 
revoked or limited at any time without right to compensation. This permit would 
be considered a grant of permission to participate in the fishery and, as such, 
would not grant the holder any right to a fish before it was harvested. As a permit, 
the privilege could also be revoked or modified for any failure to comply with the 
program or if the system is found to have jeopardized the sustainability of the 
stock or the safety of fishermen.  
S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 26 (2006). 
57. The Magnuson-Stevens Act uses different terminology for catch shares, defining 
a “limited access privilege” as a: 
Federal permit . . . to harvest a quantity of fish expressed by a unit or units 
representing a portion of the total allowable catch of the fishery that may be 
received or held for exclusive use by a person . . . . 
16 U.S.C. §1802(26) (Supp. V 2006), while NOAA Fisheries states that:  
Catch share is a general term for several fishery management strategies that 
allocate a specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to individuals, 
cooperatives, communities, or other entities. Each recipient of a catch share is 
14
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(1) shall be considered a permit for the purposes of 
sections 1857, 1858, and 1859 of this title; 
(2) may be revoked, limited, or modified at any time in 
accordance with this chapter, including revocation if 
the system is found to have jeopardized the 
sustainability of the stock or the safety of fishermen; 
(3) shall not confer any right of compensation to the 
holder of such limited access privilege, quota share, 
or other such limited access system authorization if 
it is revoked, limited, or modified; 
(4) shall not create, or be construed to create, any right, 
title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is 
harvested by the holder; and  
(5) shall be considered a grant of permission to the 
holder of the limited access privilege or quota share 
to engage in activities permitted by such limited 
access privilege or quota share.58 
However, the reauthorization contained several other 
provisions that are likely to reinforce contentions of catch 
share holders that any revocation of catch shares would 
unfairly deprive them of an interest in those shares. These 
provisions are intended to induce reliance by establishing an 
expectation that the privilege will be continued without 
revocation.  
Under the reauthorization, when developing a catch share 
program, a Council must establish policies and procedures 
regarding the allocation and acquisition of shares.59 As part of 
this development, the Council must “establish a policy and 
criteria for the transferability of limited access privileges 
(through sale or lease), that is consistent with the policies 
directly accountable to stop fishing when its exclusive allocation is reached. The 
term includes specific programs defined in law such as ‘limited access privilege’ 
(LAP) and ‘individual fishing quota’ (IFQ) programs . . . . 
NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY 1 (Nov. 4, 
2010). The definition goes on to include territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs), under 
which a person has an exclusive privilege to fish in a certain geographical area. Id. The 
inclusion of TURFs in the definition seems appropriate only in cases where the 
exclusive geographic privilege is accompanied by an exclusive privilege to a specific 
quantity of fish (or a total allowable catch is defined for the applicable geographic 
area). This paper only intends to address catch shares defining an exclusive privilege 
to harvest a certain quantity of fish. 
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). 
59. Id. § 1853a(c)(5). 
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adopted by the Council for the [allocation of shares].”60 
Although a Council could prohibit the transfer of catch shares 
pursuant to this provision, it is also clear that a Council could 
allow unfettered transferability, provided that the policy is 
consistent with the applicable allocation criteria. Notably, the 
statute specifically authorizes the transfer of catch shares by 
sale or lease. This authorization of compensated transfers 
bolsters arguments that shares are “owned” by their holders. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization requires 
Councils to consider the use of auctions or other programs to 
collect royalties for the distribution of initial or subsequent 
allocations.61 Auction revenues are to be deposited in a fund for 
management of the lien registry and the fishery from which 
the royalties were collected.62 If a Council establishes a royalty 
collection program, it will likely prompt arguments that the 
catch shares are purchased privileges and, as such, should not 
be revocable absent a refund of any previously paid royalty 
fees.63 In addition, if auction revenues are used for 
management of the fisheries, catch share holders could argue 
unjust enrichment if their shares are revoked and 
redistributed to others. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization limits the 
duration of any catch share permits issued under new catch 
share programs, but also mandates that permits be reissued 
under certain conditions. A catch share permit established 
after January 12, 2007, the date of the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
reauthorization, is issued for a period of not more than ten 
years, but “will be renewed before the end of that period, 
unless it has been revoked, limited, or modified.”64 Congress 
provided that a catch share permit can only be rejected, 
limited, or modified if the holder fails to comply with certain 
identified terms of the applicable FMP or commits an act 
prohibited by section 307 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.65 
Establishing a maximum ten-year duration for catch share 
60. Id. § 1853a(c)(7)(A). 
61. Id. § 1853a(d). 
62. Id. § 1855(h)(5). 
63. A less compelling argument could be advanced based on cost recovery payments 
required to cover government management, data collection and analysis, and 
enforcement costs associated with a program. Id. § 1853a(e). 
64. Id. § 1853a(f)(1).  
65. Id. § 1853a(f)(2)–(3). Section 307 contains general prohibitions, such as a 
prohibitions on fishing in violation a permit or after revocation of a permit. Id. § 1857. 
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permits might strengthen arguments that these permits are 
not issued in perpetuity and that the holder should have no 
expectation of permanence beyond the term of the share. 
However, defining conditions which, if satisfied, will result in 
the renewal of the permit is clearly intended to create an 
expectation that the permit will be renewed. NOAA Fisheries 
has acknowledged this interpretation by characterizing the 
renewal system as establishing a “rolling conditional 
permanence” of catch shares.66  
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization maintained the 
loan authority originally established under the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act.67 Pursuant to this authority, NOAA Fisheries, 
through its Fisheries Finance Program, may provide federal 
financing to participants in the Alaska halibut, sablefish, and 
crab fisheries and to certain Alaska community groups to 
enable the purchase of catch shares.68 NOAA Fisheries has 
limited the duration of such loans to twenty-five years for 
fishermen and thirty years for community groups.69 In 
practice, loans of twenty-five years are not uncommon.70 Given 
the nature of the catch share asset, purchasers typically rely 
on returns from catch to fund their loan payments. Purchasers 
are likely to interpret the issuance of these relatively long-term 
loans by the same agency that issues the catch shares as a 
reflection of the long-term nature of the catch shares they are 
acquiring. The long-term loans clearly reinforce any 
impression that catch shares have a degree of permanence at 
least as long as the term of the loan. 
D. Controversy Associated with Use of Catch Shares 
While the momentum for development of catch share 
programs is surging, a vocal opposition has also grown. Much 
of the opposition focuses on the distributional effects of the 
programs. Stakeholders left out of the initial allocation of 
shares assert that they are disenfranchised by the 
66. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10. 
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006). 
68. 50 C.F.R. § 253.27–.30 (2012).  
69. Id.  
70. Interview with Earl Bennett, Financial Services Division, NOAA Fisheries, in 
Silver Spring, MD (March 27, 2012). 
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programs.71 Fish processors assert that negotiating leverage 
shifts to vessel owners, devaluing their stake in the fisheries.72 
Some critics claim that catch shares lead to the redistribution 
of fishing interests from traditional fishermen to corporate 
investors. This shift purportedly undermines small fishing 
communities through redistribution of share holdings, which is 
compounded by the concentration of landings in more efficient, 
larger ports.73 Crewmembers also claim to be harmed by 
declines in crew employment with the consolidation of catch on 
fewer vessels and reduced pay associated with this shift in 
employment.74  
Throughout the debate over the merits of catch share 
management, supporters frequently describe catch shares as 
private property rights.75 These proponents contend that the 
benefits derived from catch shares arise primarily from their 
property right characteristics.76 A variety of factors are 
typically cited as indicia of property rights. Generally, a 
property right is legally characterized by the right to possess, 
use, and dispose of a thing.77 These characteristics may be 
71. Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The 
Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Quotas, 33 MARINE POL’Y 707, 708–9 
(2009). 
72. See SCOTT C. MATULICH & MICHAEL CLARK, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME & 
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CHOICES IN FISHERY 
RATIONALIZATION POLICY DESIGN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NORTH PACIFIC HALIBUT 
AND SABLEFISH IFQ POLICY IMPACTS ON PROCESSORS (2002). 
73. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 71, at 710–12; ECOTRUST & ECOTRUST 
CANADA, CATCH-22: CONVERSATION, COMMUNITIES, AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF B.C. 
FISHERIES: AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACT STUDY (2004); SETH 
MACINKO & WILLIAM WHITMORE, A NEW ENGLAND DILEMMA: THINKING SECTORS 
THROUGH, FINAL REPORT TO MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES 52–54 
(2009).   
74. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 71, at 711. 
75. Even federal regulators periodically refer to catch shares as property rights. See, 
e.g., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Ocean Quahog (Arctica islandica), FISH WATCH—
U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS, 
http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/clams/species_pages/ocean_quahog_c
lam.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (“[The ITQ] system[ is] an innovative “catch share” 
program that allocates shares of the annual harvest to individual fishermen or 
vessels.”). References to “property rights” in fisheries appear throughout EVOLVING 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2.  
76. See EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2; NAT’L 
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10; Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights 
Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 544–46 (2008). 
77. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property §§1, 3 (2009); 73 C.J.S. Property §1–2 (2012). 
Economists Anderson and Holliday suggest that critical characteristics for establishing 
a property right are a) exclusivity, b) permanence, c) security of title or interest, and d) 
transferability. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10. 
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present, to varying degrees, in a catch share program. By 
definition, catch shares provide the holder with an exclusive 
privilege to harvest a quantity of fish. Some programs permit 
transfers. In some cases, shares may be subject to the 
encumbrances of liens. The presence of these characteristics is 
cited by proponents as evidence that catch shares establish a 
property right.78 
While some proponents refer to catch shares as creating a 
property right, this liberal use of terminology has drawn the 
ire of critics of catch share management. These critics 
consistently refer to both the public trust and related common 
law doctrines, as well as statutory language, to support an 
argument that catch shares are not private property rights, 
but are only harvest privileges.79  
Case law generally supports the proposition that federally 
issued fishing permits are not property rights. As such, courts 
have held that these permits may be revoked without 
compensation.80 
While these cases appear to have settled issues related to 
whether fishing permits constitute property that is subject to 
protection under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, no court has considered 
whether a catch share permit is a property right subject to the 
takings clause.81 In addition, the facts and merits of prior 
permit cases may differ from potential future claims alleging 
that revocation of a catch share permit constitutes a 
78. Throughout EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, 
authors refer to catch share programs as creating “property rights.” See also USE OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FISHRIGHTS99 
CONFERENCE (TECHNICAL PAPER 404/2) (Ross Shotton ed., 2000), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8985E/X8985E00.HTM (in which several authors refer 
to catch share programs as “creating property rights”). 
79. Bromley, supra note 3, at 283–84 (2009); Macinko & Bromley, supra note 3, at 
638–43.  
80. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  
81. In other contexts, courts have determined that an IFQ permit is property. E.g., 
Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“There can be 
no doubt that the IFQ permit is property. It is subject to sale, transfer, lease, 
inheritance, and division as marital property in a dissolution.”). However, the court’s 
examination in Foss was limited to whether there is a constitutionally protectable 
property interest in acquiring an IFQ permit under the Due Process Clause. The court 
distinguished the claims at issue from those relating to ownership of the fish, which it 
dismissed as “pure fantasy.” Id. 
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deprivation of property. Catch share programs are defined by 
the Councils and the Secretary of Commerce under the 
authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.82 That authority 
provides substantial discretion to the Councils and the 
Secretary in shaping catch share programs to the needs of the 
applicable fishery. Recent revisions to the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act authorizing (and in some cases requiring) the Secretary of 
Commerce and Councils to incorporate certain measures into 
catch share management programs can be argued to have 
shifted these privileges closer to a property interest subject to 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.  
III. FISHERIES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Catch shares are frequently characterized as providing the 
holder with a property right in the relevant fishery. From a 
legal perspective, this statement is overly simplistic and may 
create a perception that the catch share holder possesses more 
than what is legally recognized. Given that catch shares are 
frequently bought, sold, and leased for significant amounts of 
money, and support the purchase of fishing vessels and gear, it 
is necessary to examine which rights a catch share holder may 
possess. It is then necessary to look at whether such catch 
shares would entitle the holder to any compensation should the 
regulatory program be amended or terminated, thereby 
extinguishing the holder’s shares. This section provides an 
overview of the law regarding the taking of property rights and 
how courts have considered claims for compensation based on 
taken fishing permits. 
A. Overview of Fifth Amendment Taking Law 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in pertinent part, that “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”83 The courts 
have recognized that this clause prohibits the “[g]overnment 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”84 While it is readily apparent that a formal 
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (Supp. V 2006). 
83. U.S. CONST., amend. V, cl. 4. 
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1973) (citing 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
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appropriation or physical occupation of private property by the 
government may constitute a taking, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a taking can occur “if regulation goes too far.”85 
As the Court has stated, a regulatory taking may occur when 
government action, although not encroaching upon or 
occupying private property, “still affect[s] and limits its use to 
such an extent that a taking occurs.”86 While a vessel could 
conceivably be subject to appropriation or physical occupation, 
for purposes of this discussion, we are primarily focused on 
whether a government regulatory action affecting a catch 
share (including the revocation of a catch share) could 
effectuate a taking. 
In the regulatory taking context, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit87 has established a two-part test to 
determine whether government regulation constitutes a taking 
of private property without the payment of just 
compensation.88 The court as a threshold matter, must first 
“determine whether the claimant has established a ‘property 
interest’” that has been impacted by government action.89 In 
doing so, courts are frequently forced to sort through various 
claimed interests to determine which may qualify as 
compensable property under the Fifth Amendment. For 
example, a fisherman may assert a right to a certain amount of 
fish, a right to a fishing permit, or a right to use a vessel to 
fish. If the court determines that the claimant failed to 
establish a legally cognizable property interest, the court will 
dismiss the case.90  
Second, assuming that a property interest exists, the court 
will determine whether the governmental action constituted a 
compensable taking of that property interest.91 As part of this 
determination, the court will examine whether the taking was 
85. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”).  
86. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
87. The Tucker Act vests the United States Court of Federal Claims with exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims against the United States for a taking in excess of $10,000. 28 
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). 
88. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
89. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
90. Id. at 1372 (“[I]t is axiomatic that only persons with a valid property interest at 
the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.”) (citation omitted). 
91. Id.  
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categorical or not. In explaining the difference between a 
categorical and noncategorical taking, the Federal Circuit has 
stated: 
A categorical taking has been defined as one in which 
“all economically viable use, i.e., all economic value, has 
been taken by the regulatory imposition.” A categorical 
taking is distinct from a taking “that is the consequence 
of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts 
only some of the uses that would otherwise be available 
to the property owner, but leaves the owner with 
substantial viable economic use.”92 
The Supreme Court has stated that a categorical taking 
involves the “total deprivation of beneficial use.”93 As such, a 
property owner must demonstrate that it was forced to 
“sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically 
idle.”94  
In considering a categorical taking, the nature of the 
property interest may be relevant to a court’s determination of 
whether a taking has occurred. In Members of the Peanut 
Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States,95 a court found a 
property interest in government created peanut quotas, but 
found that revocation of those quotas did not entitle the owner 
to compensation. The court based its finding on the fact that 
the quotas were wholly a creation of the government and that 
“unless the statute itself or surrounding circumstances 
indicate that such conveyances are intended to be irrevocable, 
the government does not forfeit the right to withdraw those 
benefits or qualify them as it chooses.”96 
If a categorical taking did not occur, the court will determine 
if the governmental action constituted a non-categorical 
regulatory taking based on an examination of the three factors 
identified in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New 
92. Id. (citations omitted).  
93. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).  
94. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). 
95. 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
96. Id. at 1335. The court’s decision creates some uncertainty as to whether the case 
is one of a categorical or non-categorical taking, as its rationale for the decision cites 
Penn Central, which established the test for determining a non-categorical taking. The 
contested government action, however, was a revocation of quotas, which deprived 
holders of their quotas in their entirety. 
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York City.97 Those three factors are: (1) “[t]he economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental 
action.”98  
Under the first factor, the economic impacts of the action, a 
court will assess the degree to which a regulation interferes 
with the claimant’s property interest. To do so, the court will 
“compare the value that has been taken from the property with 
the value that remains in the property.”99 While there is no 
definitive test for how much impact must occur to constitute a 
taking, the courts have suggested that the loss must be 
substantial.100 Recently, the Supreme Court stated that the 
goal of the Penn Central test is to “identify regulatory actions 
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the 
owner from his domain.”101 By characterizing a regulatory 
taking in this manner, the Court identified the magnitude of 
the economic loss that must occur. Accordingly, to succeed on a 
taking claim, the claimant must establish that the regulatory 
action rendered the subject property essentially valueless.102 
Under the second factor, interference with investment-
backed expectations, the court will examine the reliance of the 
claimant on the pre-existing regulatory regime. The Federal 
Circuit will consider three factors when determining the 
reasonableness of a party’s expectations:  
(1) whether the plaintiff operated in a highly regulated 
industry; (2) whether the plaintiff was aware of the 
problem that spawned the regulation at the time it 
purchased the allegedly taken property; and (3) 
whether the plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated 
the possibility of such regulation in light of the 
97. 438 U.S. 103 (1978).  
98. Id. at 124. 
99. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).  
100. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government could 
hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general law.”).  
101. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
102. While lower values may support a taking, courts have generally found a taking 
to occur when value losses are “well in excess of 85 percent.” Brace v. United States, 72 
Fed. Cl. 337, 357 (2006). 
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regulatory environment at the time of purchase.103 
To ensure reasonableness, courts have stated that there 
“must be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract 
need.”104 Further, in considering the nature of the regulation, 
courts have distinguished between “legislation that merely 
clarified the originally-intended meaning of an existing 
statute” and “legislative amendments that fundamentally 
changed the scheme legislated previously.”105  
Under the third factor, the character of the government 
action, the court will examine the purpose and importance of 
the public interest associated with the regulatory action.106 The 
Supreme Court has stated that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily 
be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.”107 The Court has recognized that individuals 
may be burdened by government actions as part of the benefit 
of living and conducting business in a civilized 
society.108 However, some government action is “so substantial 
and unforeseeable . . . that justice and fairness require that [it] 
be borne by the public as a whole.”109   
B. There is no Property Interest in Wild Fish, Generic Fishing 
Permits, or the Use of a Vessel or Gear 
As discussed previously, a court will conduct a two-part 
analysis to determine if a taking has occurred. First, the court 
will examine whether a property interest exists in the asset at 
issue. Second, if a property right exists, the court will examine 
whether the governmental action constituted a compensable 
taking of that property interest. 
As an initial inquiry, it is necessary to determine what 
property a claimant may allege will be taken should NOAA 
103. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
104. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (citation omitted). 
105. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis in original). 
106. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
107. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1973). 
108. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).  
109. Id. (citations omitted).  
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Fisheries revoke the claimant’s fishing permit or modify the 
governing management regime. In many instances, to 
participate in a commercial fishery, a fisherman must make 
large capital investments in the necessary gear and vessel and 
obtain the required permits before pursuing the target catch 
species. For purposes of the takings analysis, all three 
elements—fish, permits, and vessel/gear—could be considered 
property subject to compensation. As discussed below, the 
courts have considered whether a claimant has a property 
interest in all three components.  
When considering whether a property interest exists, for 
purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the Federal 
Circuit has stated that “[t]he Constitution neither creates nor 
defines the scope of property interests compensable under the 
Fifth Amendment.”110 Instead, whether a property interest 
exists is determined by the law that creates the interest and by 
“‘existing rules and understandings’ and ‘background 
principles’ derived from independent sources, such as state, 
federal, or common law.”111 In summarizing the existing law 
the Federal Circuit stated that a “compensable interest is 
indicated by the absence of express statutory language 
precluding the formation of a property right in combination 
with the presence of the right to transfer and the right to 
exclude.”112 To satisfy a court’s inquiry, the claimant must 
show more than an abstract need, desire, or unilateral 
expectation of a particular benefit, the claimant must “have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”113  
1. There is no Property Interest in Wild Fish 
It is well established that a fishermen does not have a 
property interest in fish until the fish have actually been 
caught. This principle dates back to the nineteenth century 
case of Pierson v. Post, which concluded that a property right 
110. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
111. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) and Maritrans Inc., 
342 F.3d at 1352)). As such, the typical analysis examines the relationship between the 
claimant and the alleged property, and considers whether the claimant has the right to 
exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of the property. Id.  
112. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1331.  
113. Id. at 1330. 
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in wild animals can only be acquired through possession.114 
Subsequent courts have dismissed the notion that a fisherman 
has a property right to fish prior to their capture. For example, 
the Supreme Court has stated that it is “pure fantasy to talk of 
‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or animals.”115 In expounding upon 
this statement, the Court stated that “[n]either the States nor 
the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman 
or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to 
possession by skillful capture.”116 Accordingly, the courts have 
readily distinguished between a property right in fishing 
permits and in the fish themselves.117 Regarding the latter, 
until the fish are actually captured and possessed, a fisherman 
is unlikely to succeed on a taking claim regarding the lost 
value of fish. Put another way, a fishing permit provides an 
opportunity to catch fish, or in the case of catch shares, a 
certain quantity of fish, but until possession occurs through 
capture, there is no property right in that quantity of fish. 
2. There is no Property Interest in Generic Fishing Permits 
When considering generic fishing permits, but not catch 
shares, the courts have consistently held that these permits 
are not a compensable property interest. In Conti v. United 
States, the court considered whether a regulation that banned 
the use and possession of gillnets for the purpose of harvesting 
swordfish constituted a taking of the owner’s permit, vessel, 
and fishing gear.118 Beginning in 1985, Mr. Conti had been 
commercially fishing for Atlantic swordfish using drift gillnet 
gear. Shortly thereafter, NOAA Fisheries began imposing 
increasingly severe restrictions on the fishery, culminating in 
January 1999 with the entire prohibition of drift gillnet gear in 
the Atlantic swordfish fishery. The purpose of the prohibition 
114. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The case involved a dispute of 
ownership regarding a fox that Post had been pursuing, but Pierson killed. The court 
found that “mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the 
property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.” Id. at 178. 
115. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). 
116. Id.; see also Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]o get title to a fish, a fisherman has to catch it before someone else does.”) (citing 
Pierson, 3 Cai. at 175). 
117. Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
property right in obtaining this specific permit is, of course, distinguishable from a 
claim of owning the fish themselves.”). 
118. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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was to reduce the bycatch of marine mammals and sea turtles 
while conserving swordfish and other species.119 Mr. Conti filed 
suit in December 1999 alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of 
his property without just compensation.120 
 Regarding the fishing permit, the court recognized that 
“courts have held that no property rights are created in 
permits and licenses,” noting a line of cases involving 
government grazing permits and preferences.121 Turning to Mr. 
Conti’s permit, the court determined that the fishing permit 
lacked certain qualities that typically characterize property. 
For example, while the permit could be utilized to fish, Mr. 
Conti could not assign, sell, or otherwise transfer the permit.122 
Further, the swordfish permit did not confer exclusive fishing 
privileges authorizing Mr. Conti to exclude others from the 
swordfish fishery.123 In addition, the government retained the 
ability to revoke, suspend, or modify the permit at any time.124 
Finally, the court recognized that the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
expressly states that the limited access permit system “shall 
not create . . . any right, title, or interest in or to any fish,” and 
that NOAA Fisheries could amend or terminate a permit 
program without compensation to holders of any limited access 
system permits.125 Based upon these factors, the court 
concluded that the fishing permit “bestowed a revocable 
license, instead of a property right.”126  
119. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 4055; Conti, 291 F.3d at 1337. 
120. In clarifying the nature of his taking claim, the court noted that Mr. Conti’s 
permit, vessel, and gear were not physically taken from him. The permit remained 
valid for other types of swordfishing, and Mr. Conti maintained possession of the 
fishing vessel and gear. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1339. In short, Mr. Conti’s taking claim 
asserted that the government had taken the ability to use property in a specific way. 
Id. at 1340. 
121. Id.  
122. Id. at 1341. (“[T]he rights to sell, assign, or otherwise transfer are traditional 
hallmarks of property.”) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982)).  
123. Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994), (The “right to 
exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property.’”) (citation omitted)). 
124. Id. at 1341–42 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 6235.4(a)(3) (2000)). 
125. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(3)–(4)).  
126. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1342. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that a 
contrary holding “counterintuitively would compensate a claimant for ‘the value of a 
right that the Government . . . can grant or withhold as it chooses.’” Id. (citing United 
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973)). 
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In a subsequent case, American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. 
United States, the court reaffirmed the holding in Conti 
regarding a property interest in fishing permits.127 In 
American Pelagic, American Pelagic purchased a large, U.S. 
flagged hull and converted it into the Atlantic Star, a 
commercial fishing freezer trawler.128 American Pelagic also 
applied for and received the requisite fishing permits for 
participation in the Atlantic mackerel and Atlantic herring 
fisheries. In response to concerns about the size of the Atlantic 
Star and its impacts on fish stocks, in 1997, Congress passed a 
rider to an appropriations act that had the effect of revoking 
the plaintiff’s existing fishing permits and banned reissuance 
of the permits for a year.129 The legislative ban was enacted 
again in 1998 and made permanent in 1999.130 The Atlantic 
Star was the only existing vessel affected by the legislation.131 
After subsequent attempts to participate in other fisheries 
were unprofitable, American Pelagic filed suit alleging a taking 
of its fishing permits and the use of the Atlantic Star.132  
Applying Conti, the court concluded that American Pelagic 
“did not and could not possess a property interest in its fishing 
permits.”133 Specifically, the court noted that there was “no 
contention that American Pelagic had the authority to assign, 
sell, or transfer its permits and authorization letter, nor that it 
was granted exclusive privileges to fish for Atlantic mackerel 
and herring in the EEZ.”134 The court also noted that the 
relevant regulations allowed NOAA Fisheries to deny or 
sanction the fishing permits for any reason.135 For these 
127. 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
128. The resulting fishing vessel, the Atlantic Star, was 369 feet long, displaced 
6900 gross tons, and had a total of 13,400 horsepower. Id. at 1367–68. By comparison, 
all the other vessels in the mackerel and herring fisheries were less than 165 feet long, 
displaced less than 750 gross tons, and had less than 3000 shaft horsepower. Am. 
Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 42 (2001). 
129. Am. Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1368. 
130. Id. at 1368–69.   
131. Id. at 1369.   
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1374. (citing Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“[B]ecause he could not assign, sell, or transfer his swordfishing permit, because 
it did not confer exclusive fishing privileges, and because the government at all times 
retained the right to revoke, suspend, or modify it, [Conti] did not possess a property 
interest in his permit.”)). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. (citing 15 C.F.R. § 904.301(a)). 
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reasons, the court concluded that the present fact-pattern was 
consistent with the conditions set forth in Conti; therefore, 
American Pelagic did not have a property interest in its fishing 
permits for purposes of the Fifth Amendment takings clause. 
3. There Is No Property Interest in the Ability to Use a Vessel 
or Gear 
Courts will usually find that a claimant has a property 
interest in physical property sufficient to support a taking 
claim. For example, in Conti, the Federal Circuit recognized 
that Mr. Conti’s boats, net, and gear constitute a cognizable 
property interest under the Fifth Amendment.136 Likewise, in 
another vessel-related case, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
a vessel owner had various rights in its tank barges that 
qualified them as property for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.137 The court relied on the owner’s ability to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the barges, possess or transport them, and 
alter them by adding physical improvements.138 Therefore, as a 
general proposition, it appears to be well established that a 
fishing vessel and gear will qualify as a property interest for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment taking analysis.139 
However, courts typically distinguish between a property 
right in the vessel and gear and a right to use the property for 
a particular purpose. In most cases, the loss of a fishing permit 
does not result in a change of ownership of the vessel or gear. 
Accordingly, there typically is no categorical taking, just a 
restriction on certain uses of the property. While a court will 
often recognize property rights in physical property, it has not 
recognized a right to use that property for a particular 
purpose. As the Supreme Court explained: 
136. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1342–43. 
137. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alleging 
that double hull requirement of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 affected a taking of 
Maritrans’ single hull tank barges).  
138. Id.  
139. In Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360 (2004), the court 
considered whether the enactment of the American Fisheries Act resulted in the 
taking of a fishing vessel and associated property interests. While the court concluded 
that there was no property interest in the fishing permits, the court did find a property 
interest in the vessel. Id. at 370–71. However, based upon the Penn Central factors, 
the court held that no taking occurred. Id. at 384–86. We note that this decision pre-
dated Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, so it is unclear what precedential effect 
can be attributed to Arctic King. 
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[O]ur “takings” jurisprudence . . . has traditionally been 
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding 
the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle 
of rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to 
property. It seems to us that the property owner 
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be 
restricted, from time to time, by various measures 
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its 
police powers . . .140  
In applying this rationale to the fisheries context, the 
Federal Circuit has concluded that fishermen do not have a 
cognizable property interest in the use of their vessels to fish in 
the United States EEZ.141  
In Conti, the court refused to find that a regulatory taking 
had occurred. Indeed, the court declined to apply the Penn 
Central test to the alleged taking of Mr. Conti’s fishing vessel. 
Instead, in affirming the lower court, the court stated that “Mr. 
Conti’s continuing ability ‘to sell the vessel and the gear, fish 
in a different fishery, or put both the nets and the vessel to 
other uses,’ . . . precluded a finding that a regulatory taking 
had occurred.”142 In addition, the court noted that Mr. Conti’s 
claim also failed because his use of the vessel and gear was 
totally “dependent upon a permit that was revocable at all 
times.”143  
In American Pelagic, in reversing the Federal Court of 
Claims, the court declined to find that a right to fish for 
Atlantic mackerel and herring was a legally cognizable 
property interest inherent in ownership of the Atlantic Star. In 
doing so, the court examined “existing rules or 
understandings” and “background principles” derived from 
140. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
141. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
142. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In doing so, the 
court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrus v. Allard, where the Court 
concluded that regulations prohibiting the purchase, sale, or trade of migratory birds 
and eagles, and their parts, did not constitute a taking of appellees’ Indian artifacts 
that were partially made of feathers from the protected bird species. 444 U.S. 51, 54 
(1979). In Andrus, the Court stated that the regulations at issue did not require the 
surrender of the artifacts or impose a “physical invasion or restraint upon them.” Id. at 
65. Significantly, the Court stated that “the denial of one traditional property right 
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ 
of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because 
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 65–66. 
143. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1345 n.8 (citing Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 
212, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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existing laws.144 The court reviewed the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
and preexisting common law to find that there is no right to 
fish that would inhere in an owner’s title to a fishing vessel.145 
For example, the court found that, in the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act, “Congress explicitly assumed ‘sovereign rights and 
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish’ in the 
EEZ” and that “Congress also erected an elaborate framework 
by which the fisheries in the EEZ would be managed under the 
oversight of the Secretary.”146 Because the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act was in place at the time the fishing vessel was purchased, 
the court found that the statute was an “existing rule” or 
“background principle” that inhered in American Pelagic’s title 
to the vessel.147 Therefore, because the ability to fish was 
subject to governmental permission and not a right inherent in 
the ownership of the fishing vessel, the court concluded that 
the loss of the ability to use the vessel and gear to fish was not 
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.148  
C. Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act May Create the 
Perception of Property Rights Under Certain 
Circumstances 
While the courts have definitively stated that generic fishing 
permits are not property under the Fifth Amendment, the 
courts have not yet ruled specifically on whether catch shares 
are property for takings purposes.149 While, as described below, 
144. Am. Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1376 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030). 
145. Id. at 1381.  
146. Id. at 1378–79. The court also determined that the Magnuson-Stevens Act was 
consistent with the preexisting common law with regard to the role played by the 
sovereign in managing fisheries resources. Id. at 1379 (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 
U.S. 391, 394 (1874) (“[T]he principle has long been settled in this court, that each 
State owns the beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been 
granted away. In like manner, the States own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish 
in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running.”)). 
147. Id.  
148. Id. at 1381. 
149. For purposes of marital dissolution, courts have held that fishing permits are 
property. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 599–600 (Alaska 1996) (while 
recognizing that IFQ does not constitute property in Fifth Amendment context, Court 
held that IFQ creates a property interest subject to marital division based on value 
associated with right of limited access to fishery resources). Likewise, courts have 
recognized that fishing permits are property in the due process context. Foss v. Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (In determining whether a 
party had a protectable property interest in acquiring an IFQ permit for purposes of 
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catch shares embody more attributes of property than fishing 
permits and there are strong arguments in support of finding a 
property right in catch shares, the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
contains a strong disclaimer against any compensable property 
rights. The Act provides that catch shares “may be revoked, 
limited, or modified at any time . . . shall not confer a right of 
compensation . . . shall not create . . . any right . . . or interest 
in or to any fish before the fish is harvested . . . and shall be 
considered a grant of permission” to participate in fishing 
activities.150 Accordingly, even if catch shares are found to be 
property for Fifth Amendment takings purposes, catch share 
holders remain subject to the government’s ability to make 
changes to the management regime and likely have no right to 
compensation for any loss of share value.151 Yet, many of the 
attributes of catch shares foster the perception that share 
holders possess a property right in those shares. Creating such 
a perception has significant implications for management 
programs. 
1. Arguments Supporting a Finding of Property Rights in 
Catch Shares 
Given the nature of catch shares and the administrative 
attributes of any catch share management regime, there are 
strong arguments in support of finding that a catch share is 
property right for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, 
catch shares are more closely aligned with traditional property 
and can be distinguished from the fishing permits at issue in 
Conti and American Pelagic. As with any other legal 
determination, the particular circumstances are likely to affect 
the strength of any claim that a catch share revocation should 
be considered a taking.  
In both Conti and American Pelagic, the courts emphasized 
that the plaintiffs lacked the ability to transfer, assign, or sell 
the permit at issue. In contrast, one of the hallmarks of most 
procedural due process, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]here can be no doubt that 
the IFQ permit is property”). Because the Fifth Amendment examination of due 
process rights is broader than that for a takings claim, this conclusion does not 
necessarily resolve the issue here. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the 
Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 318 (2007). 
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). 
151. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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catch share programs is that the permits can be assigned, 
leased, sold, or transferred.152 The current Magnuson-Stevens 
Act authority requires that a catch share program include a 
“policy and criteria” for transferability of shares, which could 
allow for liberal share assignment, sale, or transfer.153 A policy 
supporting freely transferable catch shares would further 
arguments that those shares are a property right.154  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to exclude 
is ‘perhaps the most fundamental of all property 
interests.’”155 In Conti and American Pelagic, the court 
emphasized that generic fishing permits created no exclusive 
fishing privilege.156 In characterizing this lack of excludability 
associated with fishing permits, the court in Members of the 
Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n stated that: 
[T]he number of [fishing] licenses to be issued under 
such a scheme is not fixed. Each additional license 
dilutes the value of the previously issued licenses. So 
long as the government retains the discretion to 
determine the total number of licenses issues, the 
number of market entrants is indeterminate. Such a 
license is by its very nature not exclusive. [T]he 
fisherman . . . can[not] exclude later licensees from 
entering the market, increasing competition, and 
thereby diminishing the value of his license.157 
By comparison, the court found the federally issued peanut 
quotas at issue in that case to be a property right as those 
quotas “represented a right to plant and produce a certain 
amount of peanuts at a certain price in specific crop 
years.”158 Catch shares likely occupy a middle ground between 
152. For examples, see NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 103–17. 
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(7) (Supp. V 2006). 
154. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1333 (“[T]he 
transferability of the quotas supports the conclusion that the quotas constitute 
property.”). 
155. Id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)). 
156. The court’s consideration of exclusivity in determining whether the Conti 
permit constituted a property right relied on the statement from Dolan v. Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 384 (1994) that “the right to exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” Conti v. United 
States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164 (1979)).  
157. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1333–34. 
158. Id. at 1334. The court noted that “[t]he statutory scheme limited the number of 
total pounds of quota peanuts and, in conjunction with the price supports, guaranteed 
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the permits in Conti and American Pelagic and the quotas in 
Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n. As defined by the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, catch shares are “held for exclusive 
use.”159 Catch shares represent a privilege, allocated to a 
limited number of qualified fishermen, to harvest a percentage 
of each year’s total allowable catch.160 Catch shares, however, 
are distinguishable from the peanut quotas at issue in 
Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n in a few respects. 
Rather than providing a fixed quantity protection annually, 
catch shares provide exclusive access to the specified 
proportion of the available catch. This exclusivity is critical to 
maintaining catch within biological limits, as it allows total 
catch to be appropriately constrained. This structure appears 
to maintain the government's authority to issue additional 
catch shares, which would dilute the interests of existing catch 
share holders by reducing the portion of the allowable catch 
that they would be allocated, in a manner similar to the 
dilution of interests that would arise from the issuance of 
additional fishing permits.161 In addition, the price protections 
embodied in those peanut quotas are not present in catch 
shares.  
So, while catch shares are more of an exclusive right and 
more akin to property than the fishing permits previously 
considered by the courts in the Fifth Amendment context, they 
also lack some of the attributes that led to the court conclude 
that peanut quotas are a property right. It may, nevertheless, 
be plausible to contend that catch shares are a property right 
because, as stated by the court in Members of the Peanut Quota 
Holders Ass’n, “[a] property right accrues when the 
government has seen fit to take a limited resource and secure 
a minimum price on the peanuts. Once a particular quota had been awarded, the 
granting of further quotas did not dilute that allotment . . . By awarding a quota 
holder a set price on a fixed quantity of peanuts, the government established a defined 
market for each quota holder—a market exclusive to that quota holder.” Id. 
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(23), 1802(26) (Supp. V 2006). 
160. Id. § 1802(26). 
161. Although no such allocation of catch shares is known to have been made, one 
year after implementation of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab rationalization 
program, Congress made an allocation of processor quota shares in that program to a 
company as a part of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006. See 
Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 417(a), 120 Stat 516, 545 (2006). The processor quota shares 
issued in that program authorize the acceptance of deliveries of harvested crab in a 
manner analogous to authorization of crab harvests under a catch share. This 
processor quota share issuance had the effect of diluting the interests of existing 
processing quota share holders in that program. 
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it for the benefit of an individual or a predetermined group of 
individuals.”162 
The auction of shares or use of a federal loan to support a 
share purchase could further reinforce arguments that catch 
shares are property rights.163 Following the payment of an 
auction price to the federal government, a share holder whose 
shares are subject to revocation would have a reasonable 
argument that the government’s acceptance of payments is an 
implicit acknowledgement of their value as property and the 
retention of any payment constitutes unjust enrichment.164 The 
ability to secure a federal loan to fund the purchase of shares 
also supports an argument that the holder has a property 
162. 421 F.3d at 1334.  
163. Such an argument is advanced with respect to proposed auctions of broadcast 
licenses. E.g., David Seth Zlotlow, Broadcast License Auctions and the Demise of Public 
Interest Regulation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 885, 904–07 (2004) (arguing that the property 
right characteristics of the broadcast licenses and the extent to which a reasonable 
expectation of compensation has been created by the government have created 
property rights.  
164. Similar (but distinguishable) circumstances arise under federal grazing permits 
and leases. Those contracts typically have a ten year term with a renewal preference 
for the permit or lease holder. Leases and permits are subject to cancellation in 
accordance with their terms. So cancellation can occur during the term of the lease. 
Yet, payments are made annually limiting potential arguments of unjust enrichment 
should a permit or lease be cancelled. In addition, leases and permits are subject to 
non-renewal, if those lands remain available for grazing under land use plans. 43 
U.S.C. § 315b (2006). Despite the legislative authority for ending leases and permits 
(and authority for non-renewal) conservation and environmental groups have bought 
grazing permits and leases to retire those privileges and, together with some ranchers, 
have periodically exerted efforts to initiate a federally funded buyback of permits and 
leases. These initiatives are for voluntary buyouts or buybacks under which a lease or 
permit holder would receive a one-time payment intended to facilitate the retirement 
or termination of the existing permit (or lease) and any preference for continuation of 
the permit (or lease). Interestingly, any contention that a buyback is appropriate to 
retire or terminate permits (and leases) implicitly acknowledges that these permits 
(and leases) carry some long term privilege to access to the grazing lands at the 
prevailing federal permit or lease rate. Similar arguments could be applied to the long 
term privilege associated with catch share allocations, whether or not those allocations 
require payment from their recipients. See April Reese, The Big Buyout, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.hcn.org/issues/295/15398; for examples of 
proposed buyout legislation see Multi-Use Conflict Resolution Act of 2005, H.R. 3166, 
109th Cong. (2005); Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act, H.R. 3324, 108th Cong. 
(2003); Arizona Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act, H.R. 3337, 108th Cong. (2003). 
Several similar buybacks of fishing vessels and federal fisheries permits have occurred 
to address overcapacity. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-699T, 
COMMERCIAL FISHERIES: EFFECTIVENESS OF FISHING BUYBACK PROGRAMS CAN BE 
IMPROVED (2001) (Statement of Barry T. Hill, Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment Report, before the House Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, 
Wildlife and Oceans). 
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interest in any catch shares. These loans have terms of up to 
twenty-five or thirty years, suggesting that the interest being 
acquired may be expected to retain value for that period. In 
addition, loans are typically secured by the purchased 
shares,165 a further acknowledgement of long-term value.  
On its face, limiting the duration of catch shares to a term of 
no more than ten years would appear to diminish any 
expectation of the permanency of catch shares and any 
assertion that the revocation of the share allocation should be 
compensable. Yet, the cyclical share renewal established under 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act (described by NOAA Fisheries as a 
“rolling conditional permanence”) could strengthen arguments 
that a catch share is a property right in some cases. Under the 
provision, catch shares are issued for a period of no more than 
ten years, but are renewed unless those shares are revoked, 
limited, or modified.166 The FMP establishing the catch share 
program may identify the reasons for a revocation, limitation, 
or modification. For example, a catch share program could 
condition share renewal on the acquisition and use of costly 
gear and adoption of costly fishing practices. Such a structure 
may lead to an expectation in the share holder that, not only 
will the share not be revoked or modified during the defined 
term, but that the shares will also be reissued at the end of its 
term, if the share holder satisfies the conditions of the plan. A 
share holder who expends the resources and efforts to satisfy 
the conditions could argue that the expenditures were made to 
ensure the continuation of the fishing privilege for an 
additional period.167  
Although Congress declined to revisit its statement that 
catch shares are not compensable property rights when it 
reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act, it expressly 
authorized the creation of catch share programs that embody 
more attributes of property than previous fishing permits. 
Notably, the hallmarks of many catch share programs are their 
165. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 253.28(g) (2011) (shares primary collateral for loan). 
166. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(f)(1) (Supp. V 2006).  
167. Revocation of catch shares subject to this “conditional permanence” may be 
distinguishable from revocation of the impermanent quotas in Members of the Peanut 
Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The peanut 
quotas under that program were revoked prior to a sunset of the program. Id. at 1335. 
Yet, those peanut quotas were not subject to any renewal provision (particularly a 
renewal provision intended to induce the holder to adopt certain practices in the use of 
those quotas, as might be created under a catch share program). Id. 
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exclusivity and transferability, two of the attributes of 
property found lacking in the fishing permits in Conti and 
American Pelagic. In addition, potential auction payments or 
federal loans further the share holder’s expectation of a 
property interest in those catch shares. Accordingly, it is 
possible that, depending upon the structure of the catch share 
program at issue, a court could find that catch shares are 
property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s takings 
analysis.  
2. Even if Considered Property, Catch Shares are Unlikely to 
Create a Right to Compensation from the Government. 
Unfortunately for the catch share holder, even if catch 
shares are considered property, this conclusion is not 
determinative regarding the availability of compensation for 
any taken shares. The second Penn Central factor, which 
considers the reasonableness of the expectations of the 
property holder, seems most relevant to any determination of 
whether revocation of catch shares would constitute a 
compensable taking. Any issued catch shares are subject to 
Congress’s statement that catch shares “shall not confer any 
right of compensation . . . if . . . revoked, limited, or 
modified.”168 This statement should diminish any expectations 
concerning the government’s authority to revoke catch shares 
without compensation.  
Although the Magnuson-Stevens Act disclaimer creates a 
substantial hurdle for a person asserting a takings claim, the 
Court has suggested that such a disclaimer alone may not be 
determinative. In Palazzalo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme 
Court held that a purchaser of land who took title after the 
adoption of wetlands regulations could challenge those 
regulations as enacting a taking.169 The Court specifically 
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). In both Conti and American Pelagic, the 
Federal Circuit relied, in part, on the ability to “suspend, revoke, or modify” to 
conclude that the permits at issue bestowed “a revocable license, instead of a property 
right.” Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341–2 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Am. Pelagic 
Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In an analogous 
situation, involving the revocation of a grazing permit issued under the Taylor Grazing 
Act, the Supreme Court found that similar language in the statute expressed the clear 
Congressional intent that no compensable property interest was created by the permit. 
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973). 
169. 533 U.S. 606, 627–28 (2001).  
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stated that “a blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no 
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an 
instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is 
taken.”170 In the case of catch shares, however, it seems 
unlikely that the creation of expectations of a secure property 
right could rise to the level of creating a right to compensation 
due to the strength of the Magnuson Stevens Act disclaimer.171 
The conclusion that catch shares carry no right to 
compensation on their revocation is also supported by the 
statement of the Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n 
court that: 
[t]he government is free to create programs that convey 
benefits in the form of property, but, unless the statute 
itself or surrounding circumstances indicate that such 
conveyances are intended to be irrevocable, the 
government does not forfeit its right to withdraw those 
benefits or qualify them as it chooses.172  
In denying compensation for the owners of peanut quotas, 
the court stated that “the property interest represented by the 
peanut quota is entirely the product of a government program 
unilaterally extending benefits to the quota holders, and 
nothing in the terms of the statute indicated that the benefits 
could not be altered or extinguished at the government’s 
election.”173 Accordingly, unless there is a clear intention that 
catch shares are irrevocable, based upon the Magnuson-
Stevens Act disclaimer, a share holder likely has no right to 
170. Id at 628.   
171. For example, in Kaiser v. U.S., the Court found a right to compensation 
resulted from the government’s creation of public access to a navigable waterway. 444 
U.S. 164 (1979). The plaintiff dredged the waterway across its land to a pond enclosed 
on the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 167. The Court found the consent of government 
officials to the dredging persuasive in finding for the plaintiff, stating that: 
While the consent of individuals officials representing the United States cannot 
estop the United States (citations omitted), it can lead to the fruition of a number 
of expectancies embodied in the concept of ‘property’—expectancies that, if 
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes 
over the management of the land owner’s property.  
Id. at 179. However, the Court in Kaiser also suggested that had the government 
conditioned its approval of dredging on petitioners’ agreement to comply with various 
measures that it deemed appropriate for the promotion of navigation, it may have 
found no compensable property interest. Id. at 178. The disclaimer of creating a 
compensable interest in the Magnuson-Stevens Act would seem to serve to overcome 
any expectations of a compensable property interest that might be created by the 
various property-like characteristics of catch shares. 
172. 421 F.3d at 1335.  
173. Id. at 1334. 
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compensation for any lost share value and associated 
investment in vessels and gear resulting from a revocation or 
modification of the applicable fishery management regime. 
IV. POLICYMAKERS SHOULD REFER TO THE JUDICIAL 
TAKINGS ANALYSIS WHEN IMPLEMENTING OR 
AMENDING CATCH SHARE PROGRAMS 
Although it may be unlikely that a court would find that a 
catch share is a compensable property right, the structure of 
catch share programs may create an expectation in share 
holders that catch shares are property that have some measure 
of permanence. Some share holders have secured loans and 
made significant monetary investments to acquire catch shares 
and purchase the necessary vessels and gear to harvest the 
associated allocation of fish. Arguably, a share holder’s 
inability to recover this lost investment following the 
government’s modification or revocation of the catch share 
program would be inequitable. In fact, a catch share program’s 
benefits are derived from inducing share holders to behave as 
if catch shares are a property right; while the government 
retains the authority to revoke those shares, based on the 
disclaimer that the shares are not property. If that expectation 
can be effectively moderated, without deterring the desired 
behavior, the potential inequity may be avoided. While, as 
discussed above, the ability of a share holder to recover lost 
investment through a Fifth Amendment taking claim is 
tenuous, the share holder’s predicament could be addressed 
through the applicable Council when developing, amending, or 
revoking a catch share program. Accordingly, fishery managers 
may benefit from consideration of the following principles, as 
informed by the Penn Central factors, when contemplating a 
transition between different management structures.  
A. Penn Central Factors Applied to Specific Fisheries 
Management Decisions 
When applying the Penn Central factors, a court undertakes 
a fact-based examination of the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with an investment backed expectation, and the 
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character of the government action.174 By considering the Penn 
Central factors, policymakers could design catch share 
programs and successor management structures that ease the 
transition between the different management regimes by 
moderating expectations of participants in the fishery. 
Specifically, measures that reduce the potential for a takings 
finding are also likely to mitigate the disruption to fishery 
operations due to any transition between alternative 
management regimes.175 
The first Penn Central factor considers the economic impact 
of the regulatory change. Annual changes in allocations arising 
from changes in allowable catches are anticipated from the 
structure of catch share programs. In addition, periodic 
amendments intended to fine tune the programs to achieve an 
intended result are commonplace and should be anticipated.176 
While somewhat disruptive to catch share holders, these 
changes generally cannot be characterized as “functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly 
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his 
domain,”177 as would be needed to support a takings claim. 
Only larger changes, such as catch share revocations or 
abandonment of a catch share program, are likely to have the 
substantial economic effect on participants that characterizes 
compensable takings.  
The economic impact of transitioning from a catch share 
program to another form of management would depend upon 
the catch share program, the subsequent management regime 
of the fishery, and how that new management dovetails with 
the catch share structure. If catch share holders are left 
without a fishing opportunity under the new management 
regime, the economic impact will be significant. For example, 
consider a Council that wishes to transition from a catch share 
174. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1973).  
175. It should also be noted that the inverse is likely also true, in that measures 
that tend toward a taking increase the disruption to fishery participants. Participants 
who are likely to gain from a catch share program might therefore advocate for 
program elements that strengthen property rights and argue for a finding of a taking 
to increase the security of their gains under the program. Even if these stakeholders 
are unlikely to persuade a court that a program modification that revokes their shares 
is a taking, policymakers supporting the modification will have to face stronger equity 
arguments in opposition to the change. 
176. Mark Fina, Evolution of Catch Share Management: Lessons from Catch Share 
Management in the North Pacific, 36 FISHERIES 164–77 (2010). 
177. Penn Central, 544 U.S. at 539. 
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program back to a limited entry program. If the catch share 
program permitted shares to be divisible on transfer, the 
fishery may have far more catch share holders than could be 
reasonably accommodated by a limited entry program. Such a 
limited entry program would require a very abbreviated 
fishing season that would pose problems to both managers 
attempting to manage to the allowable catch and participants 
attempting to realize a reasonable return from the fishery.178  
One obvious way to address this problem would be to grant 
fishing privileges (or limited entry permits) only to persons 
who hold over a threshold amount of catch shares. This, 
however, would exclude persons who hold under the threshold 
number of shares. These excluded share holders may have less 
at stake in the fishery than holders of large numbers of shares, 
but they also may have fewer resources and fishing 
opportunities. Consequently, the economic impact of being 
excluded from the successor management regime to these 
small entities could be relatively large, in comparison to the 
impact on a larger entity.  
Other catch share structures may avoid this complication. 
Some catch share programs are structured around a vessel 
licensing program (such as license limitation). Under a limited 
license program, participation is limited to holders of licenses 
that qualify for the fishery. Under an associated catch share 
program, these licenses continue to authorize participation, 
with each license holder receiving an allocation of catch shares 
(based on catch history or other factors). In effect, the long-
term catch shares are appurtenances of the license that can be 
transferred only by transferring the license. Three of the catch 
share programs in the North Pacific use such a structure, 
under which each catch share allocation is both appurtenant to 
and inseverable from a license or vessel.179 These structures 
178. For example, the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab rationalization program 
was, in large part, adopted to address overcapacity. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Final 
Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries Environmental Impact Statement, ES-2 
(2004). In each of the nine fisheries subject to that program, the current number of 
catch shares holders exceeds the number of vessels that participated in the fishery 
prior to the program, when overcapacity was perceived as a problem. NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CRAB RATIONALIZATION REPORT: 
FISHING YEAR 2010/11, at 21–22 (2011), available at 
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/ram/crab/1011crabrpt.pdf.  
179. See 50 C.F.R. § 679.20 (2012) (describing the Bering Sea pollock fishery, under 
which catch share allocations to cooperatives are based on vessel ownership and catch 
histories of qualified vessels). Recent legislation allows for limited transfer of catch 
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provide a readily identifiable means for establishing fishery 
qualification, if managers should elect to end the applicable 
catch share program. If the catch share program is abandoned 
while retaining the vessel or licensing program, it is possible 
that any negative economic effects could be mitigated, since all 
catch share program participants would be provided an equal 
opportunity to participate in the fishery under the subsequent 
management regime.180 Catch share programs can mitigate 
economic impacts of changes by adopting structures that 
accommodate those changes, including the possible transition 
to other management structures without the need to exclude 
any share holders.  
The second Penn Central factor, whether the government 
action interferes with an investment-backed expectation, is 
also likely to be affected by both the structure of the catch 
share program (and the catch share allocations defined by it) 
and the succeeding fishing privileges or management regime. 
For example, catch share holders who acquire shares at some 
cost would likely have an investment-backed expectation in the 
continuation of their catch share interest for some indefinite 
term. Persons who borrowed under a government loan are 
likely to have an expectation that their catch shares (and the 
accompanying annual allocations) will remain largely intact 
through the life of their loan. Whether the successor 
management regime allows that person to continue fishing 
would determine the extent to which the regulation interferes 
with the holder’s investment-backed expectation.  
A program with severable and divisible catch share 
allocations could have many holders of small numbers of 
histories among qualified vessels; however, allocations are only available to qualified 
vessels. H.R. 3619, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted); see 50 C.F.R. § 679.90 (2011) 
(describing catch share allocations to cooperatives based on vessel ownership (or 
limited entry license holdings, in the event a vessel is lost) and catch histories of 
qualified vessel); 50 C.F.R. § 679.80 (2009) (describing the Central Gulf of Alaska 
rockfish program under which allocations are based on license holdings and catch 
histories of vessels using qualified licenses). Under each of these programs, long term 
catch share privileges (as distinguished from annual allocations) cannot be severed 
from the associated vessel or license, as applicable.  
180. Some proponents of catch shares, however, advocate for the severability of 
share holdings as a means of achieving consolidation accompanying economic 
efficiencies. These commenters would likely argue that non-severability of long term 
share holdings (which would necessarily arise from a program that attaches the catch 
share allocation to a license or vessel) would prevent the program from fully achieving 
its potential economic benefits. E.g., Hannesson, supra note 21, at 37; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 167–68. 
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shares. Transition to another management regime could be 
complicated should NOAA Fisheries attempt to ensure that 
each of these persons is able to continue participating in the 
fishery. A threshold share holding could be required to 
continue participation under the successor management 
regime. Using this structure it may be possible to develop a 
system that allows holders of few shares to consolidate their 
holdings with others to meet the threshold to allow continued 
participation. These share holders therefore have two choices. 
They can either stay in the fishery by acquiring more shares or 
receive compensation for their shares on exiting the fishery by 
transferring their shares to another person who is 
consolidating shares to continue in the fishery. Such a system 
would need to equitably balance the interests of those who hold 
few shares with those who hold many shares. A catch share 
program that retains a vessel or licensing component could 
overcome this problem by effectively limiting participation in a 
subsequent management regime to a specific number of share 
holders that the fishery might reasonably accommodate. 
Programs that maintain vestiges of prior limited entry 
management regimes could streamline transition from catch 
share management to another management structure.181  
Catch share terms could also be used to moderate 
expectations of share holders. Arguably, the current 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, which limits share terms to ten years, 
has this moderating effect. However, in practice, the automatic 
renewal of any allocations that are not revoked, modified, or 
limited during their term may have the opposite effect; 
reinforcing expectations that catch share allocations are 
permanent, particularly if the conditions on renewal require 
the share holder to meet some performance standard. An 
alternative approach could be to establish fixed terms for 
shares; however, limiting the allocation to a fixed term begs 
the question of what management measures will govern the 
fishery and what fishing permits will be issued at the 
expiration of the term. Catch shares are viewed as successful 
for fishery management because they allow their holders to 
plan their harvest operations. Fixed terms allow for planning 
during the term, but could create great uncertainty at the 
181. These structures, however, may be disfavored some commentators, as they do 
not allow for efficiencies that would arise from restructuring long term holdings. 
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expiration of the term, unless steps are taken to provide 
fishery participants with notice of the transition.  
Under the third Penn Central factor, a court considers the 
character of the government action. Specifically, courts 
consider whether the action balances benefits and burdens of 
economic life for the common good or if the interference is so 
substantial that it should appropriately be borne by the public 
as a whole. Again, a policymaker should take this factor into 
consideration when contemplating the nature of the catch 
share program and the subsequent fishery management 
regime. For example, management measures that are 
undertaken to improve biological management of the fishery 
and are adopted to address environmental harms arising from 
fishing practices, while likely to support the common good, 
might appropriately be borne by participants in the fisheries 
who directly cause those harms. On the other hand, a 
reallocation of interests in the fishery intended solely for 
distributional effects among different classes of users could be 
argued to be such a direct interference with the share holder’s 
interest strictly for the benefit of others that it is a burden that 
should be borne by the public in general.  
For example, abandonment of a catch share program or 
redistribution of shares simply to benefit residents of certain 
economically disadvantaged communities to the detriment of 
catch share holders, who are thereafter excluded from the 
fishery, could be unfair to catch share holders who are not 
permitted to participate in the subsequent fishery.182 These 
catch share holders could reasonably argue that their losses 
are more appropriately borne by the public as a whole. A 
Council could address this shortcoming by establishing a 
transition or a less severe reallocation that accommodates 
some interests of the existing catch share holders.  
As should be apparent, the Penn Central factors could guide 
policymakers attempting to ease transitions with changes in 
management (including changes between catch share 
programs and other forms of management). Specifically, the 
factors provide a framework for balancing an individual’s 
interests against the broader public interests at issue in a 
182. Other program provisions could make renewal of shares contingent on 
maintaining a certain landing pattern to benefit fishing communities. In such a case, 
the disregard of share holder performance when determining fishing privileges in a 
new management regime could be argued to forsake an important interest that was 
important under the prior management. 
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fishery management program. Despite the likelihood that 
catch shares do not create compensable property rights, 
takings law provides a useful framework for considering the 
appropriateness of management actions that create or change 
catch share programs. Councils and NOAA Fisheries should 
consider the magnitude of impacts, the degree to which actions 
interfere with reasonable expectations of affected share 
holders, and the character of the actions (or the appropriate 
distribution of the burden between catch share holders and the 
public). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The consideration and establishment of catch share 
programs have generated substantial controversy over the 
years. While much of this focus has been on the perception that 
catch share programs establish property rights in fishery 
resources, policymakers have given relatively little 
consideration to the legal nature of the catch shares 
themselves and the associated implications for share holders. 
Although catch shares are generally referred to as property 
rights, this characterization is likely inaccurate. However, 
depending upon how a Council or NOAA Fisheries establishes 
a specific catch share program, a share holder could have 
substantially stronger arguments that allocated catch shares 
should be treated as property for purposes of compensation 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.  
For example, if NOAA Fisheries auctions shares, issues 
loans to facilitate the purchase of shares, or establishes specific 
performance criteria to support a mandatory share renewal 
process, the holder of those shares would have a much stronger 
claim of entitlement compared to traditional fishing permits. 
Nevertheless, courts are unlikely to award compensation for 
revocation of catch shares. Further, policymakers who consider 
the elements of a takings analysis under the Fifth Amendment 
may be better equipped to create, revise, and terminate catch 
share management programs in a way that achieves their 
management goals while decreasing the likelihood that a 
takings claim could arise in the future.  
To some degree, the tension arising from catch share 
management stems from the contradiction between the public 
trust doctrine, which dictates that natural resources should be 
held by the government for the public benefit, and the attempt 
to attain these same goals through a property rights-like 
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regime. To achieve the intended policy goals, catch share 
proponents advocate that catch shares should be imbued with 
the characteristics of property (such as exclusivity and 
transferability). Yet, the public trust nature of fishery 
resources is clearly maintained by the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
disclaimer that catch shares are subject to modification or 
revocation without compensation. As a result of this 
contradiction, catch share programs are developed to induce 
share holders to behave as if they hold a compensable property 
interest in those shares (both through their investment 
practices and through their defense of those interests before 
policymakers), while retaining policymakers’ authority to 
revoke those shares without compensation. The result is 
uncertainty in both catch share holders and the public 
concerning the exact nature of the interest embodied in catch 
shares. To date, policymakers have not articulated a clear 
standard for this most critical aspect of catch share 
management; instead they have proceeded to attempt to 
balance the competing interests of catch share holders and the 
public through amendments to those programs. This issue will 
remain unsettled until a definitive reconciliation of these 
contradictions is presented by policymakers. In the meantime, 
the overarching policy considerations used in property rights 
cases, such as those embodied in the Penn Central test, may 
provide a tractable guide to policymakers, share holders, and 
other stakeholders attempting to address the contradiction 
while treating all stakeholders equitably and maintaining 
fisheries management for the common good. 
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